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Chinese and Indian Trade and Investment Links with Sub-
Saharan Africa: Institutions, Capabilities and Competitive 
Advantage 
Abstract  
Because of cultural, historical and geopolitical differences, Chinese and Indian businesses have 
exhibited noteworthy differences in their operations in the economies in the Sub-Saharan Africa 
SSA. Drawing on theories related to institutions and dynamic capabilities, we analyze the China-
India differences in trades and investments in the Sub-Saharan Africa. Institutional theory helps 
us understand legitimacy-seeking activities of various actors. The dynamic capabilities 
perspectives would help understand Chinese and Indian firms’ creation and exploitation of 
competitive advantages. Our findings suggest that behaviors of Chinese and Indian firms in 
Africa are driven by different contexts, processes and mechanisms. These differences are 
reflected in the two countries’  trades and investments in terms of, inter alia, the choice of 
strategic direction and goal, motivations, size of investments, and focus on countries based on 
cultural, political and economic factors. The implications for management and public policy are 
discussed and directions for future research are proposed. 
 
Keywords: China, India, Africa, institutional fit, coercive isomorphism, normative isomorphism, 
mimetic isomorphism, south-south trade, dynamic capabilities  
 
 
1. Introduction  
The Sub-Saharan Africa’s (SSA) economic links with China and India have strengthened 
remarkably.  The Africa-India trade grew twenty-six fold during 1991-2008. Likewise, China is 
the SSA's biggest trading partner. In 2010, trades between Africa and China reached US$115 
billion (telegraph.co.uk, 2011). Multinationals from the two countries have shown significant 
variations in their operations in Africa. For instance, China has experienced relative difficulty in 
dealing with democratic countries in the continent (Michel 2008). India, on the other hand, has 
especially strong economic links with African economies that were colonized by the British such 
as Kenya and Uganda (Vines and Oruitemeka, 2008; Teslik, 2007). The divergences can be 
attributed to differences in cultures, political systems, and economic policies of China and India. 
While previous researchers have extended our understanding of China’s and India’s trades with 
Africa in terms of complementary  and substitute activities (Geda and Meskel, 2008), in little 
research have scholars examined these links from the angles of institutions, capabilities and 
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competitive advantage. In general, scholars have paid relatively little attention to trades and 
investments in Africa. Coster (2007) forcefully argued: “Think of Africa as a normal place. 
There are 15 times more analysts covering Indian companies than covering African companies, 
and 11 times more analysts covering Chinese companies than African companies. Can someone 
please switch on the light and enhance our knowledge of this place a little bit?” 
China’s and India’s trade and investment links with Africa have also been a key issue in 
the policy debates of the two countries as well as those of Western democracies. For instance, 
expanding exports to Africa has been a crucial component of India’s new foreign trade policy 
(Kshetri, 2011a). Likewise, observers have noted that Chinese trade and investment in Africa 
tend to ignore possible environmental effects, poor governance and human rights abuses, which 
have led to concerns in the West (Economy, 2010; Zafar, 2007). 
Drawing on theories related to institutions and dynamic capabilities, we propose a 
framework for analyzing major drivers of China’s and India’s trades and investments in Africa 
and examine the nature of China-India differences. We use these two theoretical frameworks 
because whereas a dynamic capabilities perspective would help us understand the natures of 
Chinese and Indian firms’ processes and resources to operate in the African market (Eisenhardt 
and Martin, 2000), formal and informal institutions in the home and the host countries affect 
such capabilities (Parto, 2005).  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: The next section provides historical 
perspectives, contemporary developments and fundamental concepts related to Africa’s 
economic links with India and china. Then, we develop some propositions regarding China-India 
differences in economic links with Africa. Next, we present our findings and provide some 
discussions on important issues regarding China’s and India’s trades and investments in Africa. 
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It is followed by a section on limitations and future research. Then the implications for 
management and public policy are discussed. Finally, we provide some conclusions.  
2. Africa’s Economic Links with India and China: Historical Perspectives, Contemporary 
Developments and Fundamental Concepts 
Table 1 compares China’s and India’s trades with selected African economies. In Table 2, we 
have compared the two countries’ trade and investment in selected dimensions. As Table 1 
shows, there are striking similarities and equally striking differences in the two countries’ 
economic links with Africa.  
Indian companies are doing business in over 20 African countries (Basu, 2010).  Indian 
multinationals such as Bharti, Reliance, Tata and Ambani have been aggressively buying large 
African assets (Allen, 2009).  As of 2007, Tata Africa had invested US$100 million in Africa 
(Noronha, 2007). Indian businesses are active in Africa in such areas as automobiles, 
telecommunications and education. India's Bharti Airtel and South Africa’s MTN Group have 
been negotiating a US$23 billion merger deal.  The Indian company NIIT has 55 centers across 
Africa, which has provided IT training to 150,000 students (Sterling, 2009). Indian companies’ 
most favored destinations in the continent have been Nigeria and South Africa (Table 1). Indian 
automobile companies such as Tata, Mahindras and Ashok Leyland have sold about 20,000 cars 
in South Africa annually (Sterling, 2009).  
Table 1 about here 
 China, on the other hand, is active in most African countries. As of the early 2011, China 
had signed bilateral trade deals with 45 African countries (telegraph.co.uk, 2011). It is argued 
that the Chinese government and its state-owned enterprises are willing to do business 
“anywhere, anytime, and at any price” (Economy, 2010). The number of China’s trade partners 
in Africa with more than US$1 billion in trade increased from 14 in 2007 to 20 in 2008 (Xinhua, 
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2009a). By the end of 2005, over 800 Chinese state-owned companies had invested in Africa in 
diverse areas such as trade, manufacturing, resource exploitation, transportation and agricultural 
development (Lagerkvist, 2009b).  
Five oil-rich countries (Angola, Equatorial Guinea, Nigeria, the Republic of Congo, and 
Sudan) account for 85% of Africa's exports to China (Hanson, 2008). Angola, which overtook 
Nigeria to become the largest oil producer in the SSA, deserves special attention (Kandell, 
2010). Crude petroleum accounts for about 95% of the Angolan exports to China. 30% of 
Angola's oil exports go to China (Nesbitt, 2009). Angola provides 50% of China’s African oil 
imports. Likewise, Ethiopia’s trade volume with China increased from US$150 million in 2003 
(Borak, 2006) to US$1.376 billion in 2009, which was 20 times higher than in 2000 
(Newbusinessethiopia.com, 2010).   
By 2008, the official Indian investment in Africa was estimated at US$2 billion and the 
private sector investment at US$5 billion (Srivastava, 2008). India invested additional US$2 
billion in Africa in 2008 (Sterling, 2009). The private sector investment in Africa is led by big 
multinationals such as Tata Group, Ranbaxy Laboratories and Kirloskar Brothers. These 
companies, however, are mainly concentrated in South Africa, Nigeria and Kenya. China had 
invested more than US$8 billion in Africa by 2008 (Harvard Business Review, 2009). China 
committed about US$8 billion in investments in the continent in 2009 (Sterling, 2009). 
Some estimates suggest that there are about a million Chinese in the continent (Danwei, 
2010). Many of them went on the continent to work in SOEs but stayed to take advantage of 
trade opportunities (Danwei, 2010). Likewise, Africa is home to 2 million Indians (Kripalani et 
al., 2008). People of Indian origin account for 68% of the population in Mauritius. Ties between 
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the two countries are close. Likewise, about 30,000 Indians live in Nigeria (business-
standard.com, 2009).  
2.1. Value added activities and benefits to African economies  
Unprocessed goods such as oil, ore, metals, and agricultural products make up 86% Africa’s 
exports to China and India. Value-added manufactured exports, on the other hand, account for 
8% of exports to China (Broadman, 2008). Analysts argue that China’s and India’s trades in 
Africa involve one-sided benefits to the Asian giants and lack reciprocal advantages to African 
economies. For instance, China allegedly buys African raw materials, does the manufacturing at 
home and sends finished goods such as clothing, electronics, and tools back to Africa (Baldauf, 
2010). High tariff rates arguably act as a barrier for high valued-added exports from Africa to 
China and India. Africa’s major export products to China and India such as coffee, cocoa, and 
cashews face such barriers (Broadman, 2007). 
 Table 2 about here 
2.2. An institutional perspective 
North (1990) defines institutions as macro-level rules of the game. All economic phenomena 
arguably have institutional components and implications (Parto, 2005). Farazmand (1999) notes: 
“All organizations and institutions perform in a political or power environment through which 
the broad parameters are more or less defined, and any organizational action contradicting rather 
than enhancing, or conforming to, that environmental power structure is sanctioned by 
institutional means of the state, whether autonomous, dependent, mediating, or weak in dealing 
with powerful transnational corporations”. Institutions define the parameters for business 
operations and hence can help us understand complex causes and roots associated with Africa’s 
economic links with China and India.  
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Institutional pressures can be explained in terms of coercive, normative and mimetic 
isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Coercive pressure entails threat or actual use of 
force by a powerful actor in order to gain compliance. Normative pressure is related to cultural 
and professional expectations. Mimetic pressure entails mimicking behaviors of other actors that 
are perceived to have a higher degree of effectiveness (Lawrence et al., 2002).  
The nature of coercive isomorphism in Africa: China, India and Western powers  
Coercive isomorphism is the result of pressures from exogenous resources providers (Lawrence 
et al., 2002). Western countries as well as China and India represent important sources of 
resources for many African countries. In return, Western countries have exerted coercive 
pressures in such areas as democracy, human rights and free trade. The World Bank, the U.S. 
and other Western powers have long used foreign assistance as a means to provide political 
reform pressures (Hinshaw, 2009). The U.S. has reportedly requested African leaders to host 
U.S. military bases, battle terrorism, and improve human rights situation (Giry, 2004). In general, 
Jane’s Intelligence Review (October 12, 2004) noted that “China is able to expand its influence 
in Africa partly because it is viewed with more credibility than Western states with imperialist 
legacies”. Commenting on Chinese construction projects in Sierra Leone, Sahr Johnny, the 
country’s ambassador to China commented: "If a G-8 country had wanted to rebuild the stadium, 
for example, we'd still be holding meetings. The Chinese just come and do it. They don't start to 
hold meetings about environmental impact assessment, human rights, bad governance and good 
governance" (Economy, 2010). 
China’s strength has arguably stemmed from its "soft power", which includes culture, 
political values, foreign policies, and economic attraction needed to persuade other nations to 
willingly adopt the same set of goals (Nye, 2004). China is especially favored by African leaders 
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who do not want to implement economic or political reforms (Thompson, 2005; Wilson  1990). 
German President Horst Kohler commented that many African economies favor Chinese 
investments because the Chinese government does not impose conditions related to democracy 
or human rights (cf. Lee, 2009). For instance, Gabonese ex-President Omar Bongo commented 
that China's cooperation comes with mutual respect and regard for diversity (Giry, 2004). 
Prior researchers have noted the important role of indirect coercion mechanisms 
associated with soft pressures (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996). The influence of soft pressure is 
mostly grounded in its “framing effect”, which is associated with indirect coercive transfer with 
no tangible punishments rather than potential coercive power such as political reform pressures 
(López-Santana, 2006, Dolowitz and Marsh 1996).  China has framed its approach as respect to 
other nations’ sovereignty without being involved in the internal affairs. The soft pressures could 
lead to better “practical compliance” if such pressures are integrated by various linking 
mechanisms and involve different types of domestic actors in the implementation (Barroso, 
2005; López-Santana, 2006).  
While India has attempted to develop a similar program known as the India 
Development Initiative to promote the idea of the country as a donor, it seems to be a result of 
ambiguity and poor performance. An Economist article notes: “.. it is not the past which haunts 
Indian strategists. It is a future dominated, many fear, by competition with India's vast, 
commodity-hungry and increasingly Afrophile neighbor, China” (Economist, 2008). India has 
offered several African countries discount loans to finance Indian exports. Yashwant Sinha, 
India's former foreign minister, noted that Indian aid to Africa “was not a carefully thought out 
program” (Cahturbedi, 2004).  
Normative isomorphism 
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Normative components introduce "a prescriptive, evaluative, and obligatory dimension into 
social life" (Scott 1995, p. 37).  To put things in context, legitimacy conferred by African 
citizens and policy makers upon China and India is a function of their evaluation of these 
economies vis-à-vis the Western powers in terms of the prescribed behaviors on trade investment 
and moral obligation.  
China has established normative legitimacy by expressing a strong sense of moral 
obligation to African welfare. In 2000, China established the pro-business China-Africa 
Cooperation Forum with 44 African nations, which has eased the way for free-trade and 
investment with the region (Leggett , 2005). China is also teaming up with supranational 
agencies to win further legitimacy. Under the auspices of the UN Development Program 
(UNDP), China-Africa Business Council was opened in 2005 and is headquartered in China. Its 
goal is to boost China’s private sector investment and development with the continent under the 
South-South Cooperation (SSC) Framework (china.org, 2005). It is a joint initiative between the 
UNDP, the Chinese government and the private-sector China Guangcai Program. Similarly, 
Asia-Africa Summit, another multilateral forum, is a joint initiative with the UNDP.  
China has created a sense of common membership in the developing world to win 
normative legitimacy and has emphasized on the need for developing nations to unite together 
against the industrialized West. During a 2003 speech in Ethiopia, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao 
said "China is ready to coordinate its positions with African countries...with a view to 
safeguarding the legitimate rights and interests of developing countries" (Leggett, 2005). In a 
keynote address at a summit of Asian and African business leaders in Jakarta, Chinese President 
Hu Jintao said: "Faced with both opportunities and challenges, we Asian and African countries 
must seize opportunities, strengthen cooperation to cope with challenges and seek common 
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development" (business.iafrica.com, 2005).  In 2009, China broadened its diplomatic support for 
Africa at a plenary session of the UN General Assembly, during which the Chinese ambassador 
declared: “In the reform of the Security Council, priority should be given to the greater 
representation of developing countries, in particular African ones” (Xinhua, 2009b). The South-
South connections have thus offered an alternative source of legitimacy, which has made the 
Chinese much more persuasive in their efforts to secure business deals in Africa.  
Among the 53 African countries, China has maintained diplomatic relations with 49 and 
China has an embassy and ambassador in each 48 of them (except for Somalia due to security 
issues). Likewise, 48 of the 49 countries (except for Comoros) have embassies in China (Shinn 
and Eisenman, 2008).   
Mimetic isomorphism 
Mimetic pressure entails mimicking behaviors of other actors that are perceived to have a higher 
degree of effectiveness (Lawrence et al., 2002). Mimetic isomorphism occurs in an uncertain 
environment when an organization models after an exemplar organization that is perceived to be 
successful (Dickson et al., 2004). Organizations mimic other organizations in the same industry, 
similar in complexity, or those “on the cutting edge” (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983).  We extend 
this logic to consider how Africans relate to the Chinese and Indian models of development.  
Some governments regard China as a model of modernization and more responsive to 
African needs and wants than Western partners. They perceive China’s fast-growing 
involvement overwhelmingly positive. China also actively promotes its development model, 
based on a limited market economy controlled by an authoritarian government. Evidence of 
Chinese influence is thus more readily apparent in authoritarian regimes. Authoritarian regimes 
find China's modernization model preferable to free-market and democratic reforms advocated 
11 
 
by the U.S. and the European Union. The degree of mimetic isomorphism of Chinese model of 
development is thus high in authoritarian regimes.  
On the other hand, Africans consider India’s model of development as less successful and 
far from the cutting edge. An Economist article notes:  “With a munificence that accompanies 
9% growth, India recently played host to some South African development experts, who were 
invited to inspect sanitation and low-cost housing. Alas, their experience--of a country where 
700 million people lack indoor lavatories and half the biggest city's inhabitants live in slums--did 
not impress. According to one insider, the South Africans laughed all the way back to the 
rainbow nation” (Economist, 2008).  
Consider Nigeria and Kenya, which were the only SSA countries included in the 2009 
Pew Global Attitudes Survey conducted by the Washington, DC-based Pew Research Center. 
Both have an electoral democracy and are classified by Freedom House as  “partly free” 
countries. The Pew survey found that 85% of Nigerians have favorable opinion of China while 
79% of Nigerians have favorable opinion of the U.S. (Pew Research Center, 2009a, b). The 
respective proportions for Kenya were 73% and 90% respectively (Pew Research Center, 2009a, 
b). The Kenya-Nigeria differences may be attributable to U.S. president Obama's Kenyan 
connection and the fact that Kenya has a higher degree of political freedom than Nigeria.  
2.3. The dynamic capabilities perspective  
The dynamic capabilities perspectives helps disentangle the contexts, mechanisms and processes 
associated with Chinese and Indian firms’ creation and exploitation of competitive advantages in 
Africa. Eisenhardt and Martin (2000) define dynamic capabilities as: “The firm’s processes that 
use resources – specifically the process to integrate, reconfigure, gain and release resources – to 
match and even create market change. Dynamic capabilities thus are the organizational and 
strategic routines, by which firms achieve new resources configurations as markets emerge, 
12 
 
collide, split, evolve, and die” (p. 1107).  Firms with dynamic capabilities acquire, retain and 
integrate resource to develop value-creating strategies (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000). 
  Firms with dynamic capabilities can “integrate, build, and reconfigure internal and 
external competencies to address rapidly changing environments” (Teece et al., 1997, p. 516). 
These capabilities enable a firm to reconfigure its resource base and adapt to changing market 
conditions in order to achieve a competitive advantage (Zahra and George, 2002). 
Chinese and Indian companies’ dynamic capabilities to operate in Africa  
Chinese and Indian companies are in a position to reconfigure their resources to operate in 
Africa. They can easily adapt the business models used in their domestic markets (Harvard 
Business Review, 2009). Indian firms’ capability to deliver value for money in the domestic 
market has been an important source of their competitive advantage to operate in the African 
market (Kumar, 2008). That being said, it is also clear that Chinese firms seem to be in a better 
position than those from India to build dynamic capabilities to operate in Africa.  
  First, Chinese firms have a higher degree of dominance and power in the world economy 
than Indian firms. For instance, compared to India, China had almost twice as many companies 
in the Forbes’ “Global 2000” list of the world’s biggest companies in 2009 (DeCarlo, 2009, 
Table 3). It is argued that the Indian multinational is “in an embryonic stage” (Kumar et al., 
2009). While most Chinese firms in Africa are medium-sized or large state-owned enterprises, 
Indian companies exhibit a higher degree of heterogeneity in terms of size (Broadman, 2008).  
Table 3 about here 
 
Second, China spends higher than India on R&D (Table 3). More importantly, Chinese 
firms are developing products that are relevant to developing countries. To take one example, 
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researchers at China’s Tsinghua University are testing a nanotech bone scaffold in patients. 
Experts say that this application of nanotechnology is especially relevant for developing 
countries, where the number of skeletal injuries resulting from road traffic accidents is high. 
Third, Chinese firms have leaner cost structures, which is important to develop value-
creating strategies in the African context. India has not been able to compete on low wages. India 
is currently a leader in IT services. India’s emphasis on services has been less effective in 
building dynamic capability (Matthias, 2006). China’s dominance in manufacturing and trade, 
not only with Africa but also with the industrialized countries, has been at the expense of other 
emerging economies such as India and Mexico (Shaw et al., 2007). Harry Broadman, a World 
Bank adviser on Africa, put the issue this way: "The Chinese have deep pockets. They have the 
ability to undercut and win every contract - and not just against India. It's the US and Europe, 
too" (cf. Schatz and Sappenfield, 2008).  
3. China-India Differences in Economic Links with Africa: Some Propositions  
3.1. National-level versus firm-level strategies  
Chinese firms have an access to external competencies associated with the government’s deep 
pockets, which has been particularly important to build dynamic capabilities to operate in Africa. 
While most Indian companies operating in Africa are privately owned or have a mixed private-
public ownership, most Chinese firms are state-owned (Broadman, 2008). India’s model of 
private investment differs from China’s model of state-managed investments (Teslik, 2007).  
India’s operations in Africa arguably are “driven by firm-specific considerations“ (Upadhyay, 
2007). According to UBS, the state accounts for at least 70% of the Chinese economy compared 
to less than 7% in India (Pei, 2006).  
China is actively expanding political as well as economic ties with major emerging 
markets in Africa and elsewhere (China Business Forecast Report, 2011). China's state-operated 
14 
 
Exim Bank is the world's third largest credit agency, which, for African economies, has become 
an alternative to the World Bank (Hinshaw, 2009). Beyond all that, China has provided 
considerable development aid, mainly in the form of low-interest loans, to African countries, 
which has helped Chinese firms’ operations in the continent. They include US$13 billion to 
Angola, US$9 billion to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and US$2.5 billion to Ethiopia 
(Shinn and Eisenman, 2008). Commenting on Chinese approach in Africa, Prashant Ruia, group 
CEO of the Indian company Essar recently put the issue this way: “We are nearly five to seven 
years late…..Competing with the Chinese is impossible... They are building roads, airports and 
projects as a grant. They are taking a 20 year investment risk — something private companies 
like us cannot do. We do not have the kind of backing that the Chinese have, they are present on 
a much larger scale too. They have had a head start and have been there for the past 10 years” 
(cf. Sterling, 2009). Likewise, Shashi Ruia, Essar Group chairman noted that India lacks a  
“national vision” (Beckett, 2010).  
While India has also started providing developmental aids to some African economies, it 
operates at a much small scale. Indian commercial loans to Africa amounted about US$110 
million in 2003 (Cahturbedi, 2004). During the India-Africa Summit in April 2008, Indian 
government promised that it would provide US$500 million in grants to African countries over 
the next five to six years and would double credit lines to US$5.4 billion. In May 2011, India 
announced a US$5 billion development package for Africa (Baldauf, 2011).  
Due to China’s mature and effective foreign policy, the effect of the state’s deep 
entrenchment in the economy on China’s trade with Africa has been more pronounced and is 
working towards achieving national goals. Between the mid-1950s and mid-2000s, China’s 
foreign aid to Africa was estimated at RMB 44.4 billion in over 900 infrastructural and social 
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projects (Zhan, 2006). India has responded by increasing its aid to Africa. India also offered 
US$5 billion in credit at the 2008 Indian-African summit. However, these actions have brought 
few commercial gains to India. For instance, India has been an African Development Bank 
member since 1982. Yet it has less voting weight than most other donor countries such as China, 
Japan, Saudi Arabia, and South Korea (Feigenbaum, 2010).  
One reason behind India's failure to act in its national interest and achieve national goals 
concerns the underdeveloped “foreign policy software" and institutions (Markey, 2009). 
Feigenbaum (2010) notes: “India's foreign service is tiny; seniority often trumps other criteria for 
promotion in the foreign service; and think tanks and university area-studies programs are 
underfunded and small. Improvements in these domains will be important if India is to fashion 
and implement more global strategies”. Comparing China’s and India’s approach to Asian 
economies, Atal (2010) comments:  “China's success in the Subcontinent reflects India's own 
foreign policy blunders. …. India has been overconfident, assuming that regional neighbors 
would naturally choose it over Beijing without providing them with positive incentives to do so”. 
This observation can be extended to India’s relationship with African economies.  
China is arguably “playing a game of scale” in Africa (Suri & Mahajan-Bansal, 2009). In 
2008, China signed a US$9 billion civic infrastructure agreement with the Democratic Republic 
of Congo (DRC) for 10 million tons of copper ore (Lee, 2010).China agreed to build 2,400 miles 
of road, 2,000 miles of railway, 32 hospitals, 145 health centers and two universities for the DRC 
(Suri & Mahajan-Bansal, 2009). China Petroleum and Chemical (Sinopec) announced that it 
would acquire a 55% stake in refinery JV in Angola for US$2.46 billion (nytimes.com, 2010). 
Likewise, China National Petroleum Corp. (CNPC) has invested US$3 billion in Sudan's Greater 
Nile Petroleum and owns 40% stake (Kandell, 2010). CNPC’s other ventures in Africa include a 
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US$385 million refinery in Algeria and a US$5 billion deal to develop oil in Niger (Suri & 
Mahajan-Bansal, 2009).  
Business relationships’ embeddedment in wider institutional field 
Prior research indicates that isomorphism measures that pay attention as to how they are 
embedded in the “wider institutional field” (Lawrence et al., 2002) or “networks of other already 
legitimate institutions” (Suchman 1995) are more likely to be successful. In this regard, an 
important dimension of Africa-China ties is a wide range of aids, concessions, assistances and 
technologies provided by China to African countries.  Zambian economist Dambisa Moyo was 
quoted as saying: "No country has had a bigger impact [than China] on the political, economic 
and social fabric of Africa" (Macdonald, 2010). During the second China-Africa trade summit 
held in Addis Ababa in 2003, China wrote off US$1.3 billion in debt owed by 31 heavily 
indebted African countries. In an effort to boost trade links, China has provided 28 most 
underdeveloped African countries with zero tariff treatment and special preferential tariff rate for 
exports of about 190 products to China. These range from food, mineral product and textile, to 
machinery and electronics.  
While China's relation with Africa in the 1960s and 1970s was rooted in political and 
ideological solidarity, it is becoming more economic driven. Nonetheless, continuation of 
activities that were originally designed to spread Chinese-style communism have helped to 
strengthen China’s economic ties. There are about a thousand Chinese doctors working with 
HIV/Aids patients in Africa and over 10,000 agricultural engineers working in Africa. These 
factors have influenced the lens through which Africans view China. 
To gather cognitive legitimacy, China is strengthening cultural ties. China International 
Radio, the voice of Beijing, launched a new FM station in Nairobi, Kenya, which broadcasts 19 
hours a day in English, Chinese and Kiswahili. The voice of Beijing is competing with the BBC 
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World Service and Voice of America. Similarly, in 2003, more than 6,000 African students 
received technical training in Chinese universities. China’s early relations with the continent 
included large number of scholarships for African elites to study in China.  Likewise, by 2004, 
China had sent 1,401 peacekeeping troops to take part in nine UN missions in Africa. Similarly, 
by the end of 2004, 840 Chinese peacekeepers participated in seven UN missions in Africa 
(African Times, 2004a). In the same vein, since 1964, China has sent over 15,000 doctors to over 
47 African countries and treated approximately 180 million patients (Nye, 2004).  
Official contacts between China and Africa include frequent high-level visits by the 
President, the Premier, and ministers. Most impressive of all, since 1991, the foreign minister’s 
first foreign visit each year has been to Africa (Shinn and Eisenman, 2008). The above leads to 
the following: 
Proposition 1: Indian firms’ behaviors are more likely to serve to implement specific choices 
made by an organization and are therefore likely to follow from the firm's specific strategy. 
Chinese firms’ programs and initiatives, on the other hand, are more focused on accomplishing 
national-level goals.  
Corollary to Proposition 1: Chinese firms are likely to have more large-scale investments1 in 
Africa than Indian firms.  
3.2. Resource-seeking versus market-seeking investments 
It would also be interesting to compare China’s and India’s approach to market-seeking and 
resource-seeking investments in Africa. Resource seeking investments are made in order to 
establish access to basic material, input factors and natural-resource such as those in energy, 
metallic minerals, wood, paper and other raw materials. Market seeking investments are made to 
enter an existing market or establish a new market. In this regard, it is important to note that 
                                                          
1 By large scale investments, we mean investments over $10 million. In India, for instance, investments exceeding 
Rs. 500 million (about $10 million) are considered to be large scale investments 
(http://www.starpackaging.biz/content/aboutus/aboutus_businessoverview.html). Likewise, in Korea, large-scale 
investments are those over $10 million each (see: “Recent Trend of Foreign Direct Investment”, Korea Herald 2001. 
4. 7, http://www.keb.co.kr/english/unit/com_htm/contents-3-5-87.htm)  
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China’s consumption of electricity and other types of energies is much higher than India ‘s 
(Table 3). In 2003, China surpassed Japan to become the world's second-largest oil consumer, 
after the U.S. According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, China accounted for 
40% of total growth in global demand for oil during 2001-2005 (Pan , 2006). China became a net 
importer of petroleum products since 1993 and of crude oil since 1996. The country relies on 
overseas producers for one-third of its supplies and the proportion is expected to reach 60% by 
2020 (business.iafrica.com, 2005). At the same time, except for coal, China lacks most other 
types of natural resources.  
Following the President Jiang Zemin’s "go out" policy in the 1990s, which encouraged 
the country's state-owned enterprises to go overseas to acquire natural resources, China's trade 
with resource-rich developing countries has increased dramatically (Economy, 2010). China has 
been making offshore investments in natural resources not only in Africa but also in diverse 
geographical locations such as Russia and Venezuela (Altman, 2009). During 2001-7, China’s 
trade with Southeast Asia, Latin America, and Africa grew by 600 percent (Economy, 2010).  
Chambishi copper mine in Zambia is one of the biggest Chinese mining operations in Africa. In 
2006, China National Offshore Oil Corporation agreed to pay US$2.3 billion for a stake in a 
Nigerian oil and gas field (Srivastava, 2008). In 2009, the Chinese oil company Sinopec 
reportedly made an offer to Ghana for oil discovery (Connors, 2009). China offers combinations 
of trade and aid deals, infrastructural development, as well as educational and technical training 
opportunities for countries that are rich in natural resources (Economy, 2010). 
In sum, while both Chinese and Indian companies have gained access to African natural 
resources (Teslik, 2007), the level of China’s involvement has been higher in the continent. 
Based on above discussion, the following proposition is presented:  
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Proposition 2: Compared to Indian firms, Chinese firms are more likely to engage in resource-
seeking investments in Africa.  
3.3. China vs. India in authoritarian regimes 
According to Freedom House, of the 48 countries in the SSA, only 9 (combined population:  
102.6 million) were “Free” in 2010 while 23 (combined population:  496.8 million) were “Partly 
Free” and 16 (combined population:  235.6 million ) were “Not Free” (freedomhouse.org 2010). 
Note that 11 were in the “Free” category in 2006. Freedom House referred Africa as the 
"bleakest" region in terms of political rights and civil liberties in 2009. In 2009, Africa 
experienced more declines in political rights and civil liberties than any other region in the 
world.  Freedom House’s survey indicated that human rights situation worsened in 16 countries 
in Africa in 2009.  According to the Council on Foreign Relations, only 40% of African 
countries are electoral democracies (Kempe, 2006).  
Observers note that China has gradually changed its role in Africa from a mere trade 
partner to more “advisory approach” (China: Country Analysis Report, 2009). Consequently 
China’s political influence is increasing.  Such a role has a special significance in authoritarian 
regimes. Especially, China has been able to secure political influence rapidly in countries that are 
avoided by Western nations because of poor governance and opaque political systems and the 
lack of civil liberty and political freedom (Thompson, 2005).  Pilling (2010) put it best: “China’s 
Communist system has little obvious attraction for advanced nations, though for those poor 
countries wishing to prioritise modernisation over democratic niceties it arguably offers a 
template”. For instance, Nigeria is fighting a continuous struggle with rebels. The Nigerian 
government thus preferred to have a business partner that is indifferent to human rights. In 2004, 
the governor of Nigeria's Kaduna Province, which was involved in sectarian killings and adopted 
a Shariah-based criminal law, invited Chinese investors (Giry, 2004).  
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India has also intensified diplomatic and economic relations (Fidler and Ganguly, 2010). 
Yet researchers have argued India’s efforts to utilize its cultural and political attractiveness to its 
advantage have been far from effective (Lagerkvist, 2009a). Moreover, Indian model of 
development is not attractive for most authoritarian regimes.  
One way to understand China-India differences in authoritarian regimes would be to 
consider China’s export of censorship technologies.  China has provided censorship technologies 
(such as phone-tapping, radio-jamming and internet-monitoring equipment) to Robert Mugabe’s 
government in Zimbabwe. During the election campaign in 2004, a radio-jamming device 
located at a military base outside Zimbabwe’s capital prevented independent radio stations from 
broadcasting. Similarly, the shortwave station, SW Radio Africa, an independent radio station 
based in Britain that employs exiled Zimbabwean journalists, experienced jamming problems in 
2004. VOP, a shortwave station broadcasting from Madagascar, has also reported such problems. 
The BBC reported that Chinese intelligence officers visited Harare in 2005 to give further 
training in telecommunications and radio communications to Zimbabwean technicians. 
South Africa-based Zim Online reported that in June 2005, Mugabe announced his government’s plan 
to ‘outlaw the dissemination through the internet of information and material it deems offensive’ (Zim 
Online, 2005). Another ZimOnline story in 2004 reported that Harare was seeking help and 
equipment from China to monitor e-mails and information exchanges. There have also been reports of 
arrests in an internet café for sending e-mails that criticised the government. 
Experts say that China has tremendous potential to become a hotbed for advanced censorship 
technologies and is likely to capture a substantial share of the rapidly growing global market for such 
technologies, which is currently supplied by Western corporations. For instance, China’s large market 
allows it to test a number of experimental blocking features that cannot be done in most Western 
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countries. In particular, as China is already a regional internet access provider for its neighbours such 
as Vietnam, North Korea, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, these countries can easily be China’s market 
for censorship know-how and technologies. In line with these arguments, the following proposition is 
presented: 
Proposition 3: Chinese firms’ advantages over Indian firms to compete effectively are likely to 
be higher in African countries that perform poorly on civil liberty and political rights than those 
that are more democratic. 
3.4. China vs. India in Commonwealth members in Africa 
Prior researchers have suggested the prevalence of kinship-based culture in the Asian business 
context (Yin and Choi, 2005; Tsai and Eisingerich, 2010). In this regard, it is worth noting that 
compared to their Chinese counterparts, Indian immigrants are more integrated into the African 
society. According to a 2006 survey of  ethnically Indian and Chinese business owners, about 
50% of the ethnic Indians had acquired African nationalities compared to only 4% ethnic 
Chinese (Broadman, 2008). In general, thanks to the raj legacy, India arguably is more connected 
into and more compatible with the established global economy (Das, 2000; Shaw et al., 2007). 
A lower degree of integration of Chinese workers into the African socioeconomic 
structures can also be explained with the nature of Chinese nationalism. Pei distinguishes 
nationalism related to universalistic ideals (democracy, rule of law, free marketplace) and 
institutions from that based on ethnicity, religion, language, and geography. China falls in the 
latter category. In China, the state arguably bolsters its legitimacy through invoking a deep sense 
of "Chineseness" among citizens (Ong, 1997). Sautman (2001) has documented how China has 
adapted a body of complex scholarship to invoke a deep sense of "Chineseness": “Nowhere is 
this more pronounced than in China, where these disciplines [Archaeology and 
paleoanthropology ] provide the conceptual warp and woof of China's "racial" nationalism”. 
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 To move to a different issue, psychic distance from the home country or primary markets 
is one of the important determinants for foreign market selection (Dunning 1988). The stage 
model suggests that international expansion is influenced by managerial learning. 
Internationalization begins with low-risk, indirect exporting to "psychically close" or similar 
markets (Johanson and Vahlne, 1977). International activities require both general knowledge 
and market specific knowledge. Over time and through experience, firms increase their foreign 
market commitment and expand to more "psychically distant" market (Cavusgil, 1984). The 
network theory draws on social exchange and resource dependency and focuses on interpersonal 
relationships.  According to this perspective, internationalization is a result of interaction and the 
development of a multitude of relationships.  A growing body of research has demonstrated that 
business markets are structured as networks (Johanson and Vahlne, 1992).  
One broad observation made by van de Walle (2008) shapes everything that follows: 
"The relationship between India and the African continent relies on private networks, linked to 
long-standing Indian populations in the region. The relationship between China and the region, 
on the other hand, is more recent and more often mediated by formal government-to-government 
agreements".  
Traditionally, India’s trade and investments in Africa were concentrated in countries that 
have a high proportion of Indian population, especially those colonized by the British (Teslik, 
2007). For instance, today’s Kenya and parts of Uganda were administered by the British out of 
Bombay. Indian rupees were used in these countries during 1897-1920. The rupee is still used in 
Seychelles and Mauritius (Vines and Oruitemeka, 2008). It is estimated that the ‘Commonwealth 
factor’ provides Indian companies a 10–15% advantage in economic interactions in English-
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speaking countries (Shaw et al., 2007).  Eighteen African countries are members of the 
Commonwealth of Nations.  
Commonwealth African countries seem to be attractive markets for Indian firms. For 
instance, India’s exports to Uganda have increased in recent years. In 2004, India was the second 
biggest exporter to Uganda (after Kenya). In 2004, India’s exports accounted for 8.5% of 
Uganda's total imports (FICCI, 2004). India’s Essar Group invested US$100 million in Essar 
Telecom Kenya Holdings. As of 2009, Essar had 400,000 telecom subscribers in Kenya. Essar 
also has a 50% stake in Kenya Petroleum (Suri and Mahajan-Bansal, 2009). From April–June 
2007 to April–June 2008, India’s trade with East Africa grew by 82% (Scott, 2009).  
A related point is that African leaders from some Commonwealth countries have 
expressed their affinity with the Indians while they have been hostile to the Chinese. In 2003, 
during her India visit, then South African Communication Minister Ivy Matsepe Casaburri noted 
that India and South Africa had ties since the days of Mahatma Gandhi (Jafri, 2003). On the 
other hand, in 2007, the South African president warned that the continent was in a risk of being 
colonized by China (Pant, 2008).  Michel (2008, p. 45) notes: “China seems to have difficulty 
maneuvering in countries more democratic than itself”. Increasing Africa-China ties have led to 
the closure of uncompetitive local textile mills in many African countries. Chinese businesses, 
however, are facing hostile reactions in more democratic countries such as South Africa (Pant, 
2008). Thus, we propose that: 
Proposition 4: Indian firms’ advantages over Chinese firms to compete effectively are likely to 
be higher in the members of the Commonwealth of Nations than in non-members. 
3.5. Chinese vs. Indian firms in African countries with various levels of political risks 
Prior researchers have suggested that there are high risks associated with large scale investments 
for the private sector. The risks are particularly high for projects involving sunk assets, which 
cannot be removed for use in other places or cannot be redeployed for other purposes (Rees 
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1998). Normally infrastructure investments, which tend to be expensive, satisfy these criteria. In 
this regard, thanks to the government supports, Chinese SOEs can take risks that other 
multinationals avoid. Consider the Zambian copper mines. In 2009, China opened the Albidon 
nickel mine in Zambia, which was closed by its Australian owners (Macdonald, 2010). 
Consider China’s economic links with African countries that are considered to be the 
riskiest by the Political Risk Services’ (PRS) International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). China's 
most successful African energy investment has been arguably in Sudan (Hanson, 2008), which 
had an ICRG rank of 133 (out of 140 countries considered) in January 2010.  60% of Sudan's oil 
exports go to China (Nesbitt, 2009). China’s ability to manage political risks in the world’s 
riskiest countries is apparent in its significant economic links with African economies that are 
considered to be riskier than North Korea (ICRG rank: 132).  For instance, Equatorial Guinea 
(ICRG rank: 134) is a big oil supplier to China.  China has a significant trade relationship with 
Zimbabwe (ICRG rank 138). Chinese imports from the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
(DRC) (ICRG rank: 139) more than quadrupled from 2004 to 2007 (N'Sakila, 2008).  
India’s approach to avoid political risks is summarized by Suri & Mahajan-Bansal 
(2009): “Rather than run smack into Chinese competition in Africa, one tactic to tap Africa is to 
go to countries where China isn't as active. That's what the Essar group did. It focused on East 
Africa. It figured that the region was largely English speaking and had lower political risks”. It is 
thus proposed that: 
Proposition 5: Chinese firms’ advantages over Indian firms to compete effectively are likely to 
be higher in countries that have high political risks than those that have low political risks. 
 
4. Findings and Discussions 
Our findings suggest that behaviors of Chinese and Indian firms in Africa are driven by different 
contexts, processes and mechanisms. These differences are reflected in the two countries’  trades 
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and investments in Africa in terms of, inter alia, the choice of strategic direction and goal, size of 
investments, and focus on countries based on cultural, political and economic factors. First, due, 
in part, to the state's deep involvement in the economy, Chinese firms’ programs and initiative in 
Africa are more focused on accomplishing national-level goals. A related point is that Chinese 
firms are more likely to be in a position to make larger scale investments in the continent. An 
implication of China’s higher level of resource consumption and mainly state-driven economic 
links with Africa is that Chinese firms are more likely to engage in resource-seeking 
investments.  
As illustrated by the arguments and examples presented above, Chinese firms’ 
competitive advantages over Indian firms are likely to be higher in countries that perform poorly 
on civil liberty and political rights or those that are characterized by high political risks. Thanks 
to the Indians’ strong cultural ties and the strong community ties, on the other hand, Indian 
firms’ competitive advantages seem to be higher in the members of the Commonwealth of 
Nations. . 
The different sources of legitimacy discussed above and their importance are not static. 
Following the analogy of social ecosystem, we can argue that international trade and investments 
also influence institutions. Notwithstanding their connotation of persistence, durability and 
stability, institutions are subject to change in evolutionary time. Zucker (1988) argues that 
institutions continuously undergo change due to entropy, a tendency toward disorder or 
disorganization. An implication of the entropy-like characteristics is that people and 
organizations can modify and reproduce institutions. Institutional changes take place 
incrementally as well as in discontinuous fashions. The pattern of international trade and 
investment is thus likely to change institutional structure of involved trade partners.  
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The fact that China has been a big player in Africa has also made Chinese players 
vulnerable to attacks from various constituencies. With respect to the Africa-China business ties, 
not all stakeholders view China’s involvement in Africa positively. Many African manufacturers 
and trade unions have criticized China’s approach. Some have branded China’s involvement in 
Africa as a new form of imperialism. South Africa's trade unions, for instance, have complained 
that the country’s imports of cheap hi-tech products from China are ravaging domestic 
technology industries. In South Africa, there was a threat of a boycott of stores that carried 
Chinese goods in the last quarter of 2004. Some local activists want local stores to agree to a 
75%-25% balance of locally-made to imported goods (The Economist, 2006). Similarly, 
Zimbabwean manufacturers and retailers have complained that Chinese imports have forced 
them out of business. Likewise, competition from Chinese firms forced over 10 textile factories 
in Lesotho to close in 2005 alone leaving 10,000 employees jobless. This phenomenon is 
referred as Chinese tsunami in Lesotho. A member of Lesotho's Parliament noted: ”The Chinese 
tsunami has created more poverty by extensive job losses" (Peta, 2005).  
Some African economies are experiencing trade deficits with China, which are likely to 
fuel opposition to trades with China. For instance, South Africa’s trade deficit with China 
increased from US$24 million in 1992 to US$400 million in 2004 (The Economist, 2006 ). 
China’s African involvement has also been criticized by environmentalists. A July 2005 
report of the International Rivers Network and Friends of the Earth accused China’s Exim Bank 
for funding environmental unfriendly projects such as the Merowe Dam in Sudan. 
Institutional changes taking place in China are also likely to alter the landscape of Africa-China 
trade and investment. For instance, China is undergoing a rapid privatization of its economy. 
Currently, China’s state-owned enterprises, which are less concerned with near-term profits, 
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account for a considerable share of Chinese investment in Africa (Ranneberger, 2005). Chinese 
private firms may not necessarily follow the same modus operandi. Moreover, as noted above, 
China’s health diplomacy has played a critical role in winning cognitive legitimacy in Africa. 
Like other sectors of the Chinese economy, the medical system is also being privatized. Chinese 
doctors are less willing to accept postings in Africa, particularly because of a low level of current 
government stipend (Thompson, 2005). 
Finally, there is also some movement toward democracy in Africa (Easterly, 2005), albeit 
very slow. A stride toward democracy and Africa's changing attitude towards issues such as 
humanitarian intervention (Alden , 2005) may also weaken the Africa-China business ties. 
5. Limitations and Future Research  
Several limitations of this research must be recognized in a balanced discussion of its findings. 
First, because our approach was theory-building in nature and, therefore, we did not formally 
analyze qualitative or quantitative data on Africa’s economic links with China and India. An 
additional limitation of this research is that we compared China’s and India’s trades and 
investments across African economies only in terms of differences in in formal and informal 
institutions.  A further limitation is that this paper analyzed broad trade and investment ties of the 
two Asian giants with the SSA economies rather than those in a specific sector.  
Future research is needed to address some of the above limitations.  An area of future 
research might be to compare the two Asian giants’ trades and investments in Africa in specific 
industries or economic sectors such as oil, outsourcing and automobile. Such study would help 
understand China-India differences in terms of trades and investments in Africa in relation to the 
important idiosyncratic features of the industry.  
Second, an empirical examination of core premises of this paper would provide a deeper 
understanding of the two Asian giants’ trade and investment links with the SSA. It would shed 
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light into the contexts and mechanisms associated with institutions, capabilities and competitive 
advantages of Indian and Chinese firms to operate in Africa.   
Finally, future research might also explore the generalizability of the above findings 
regarding China’s and India’s trades and investments to the contexts other economies. For 
instance, scholars need to examine if observations regarding China’s higher relative success in 
failed states and authoritarian regimes and India’s higher relative success in democratic 
economies are also valid in non- African developing economies. 
6. Implications for Management and Public Policy 
The preceding discussion has important managerial and policy implications: 
Implication 1: The China, India and South Africa (CISA) framework  
It is important to analyze China’s and India’s trades and investments in Africa vis-à-vis that of 
South Africa. Shaw et al. (2007) refer China, India and South Africa (CISA) as “‘emerging 
economies’ aspiring towards the top tier of the global architecture” (p. 1256) and argue that 
CSIA will shape the policy and economic landscapes of sub-Saharan Africa in an important way. 
According to the UN Conference on Trade and Development’s (UNCTAD), World Investment 
Report 2006, over  50% of all FDI inflows in Botswana, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
Lesotho, Malawi and Swaziland came from South Africa.  In this regard, it is important to note 
that institutions in South Africa are more similar to India than to those in China. The institutional 
similarity is likely to put South African companies in more direct competition with the Indian 
than with the Chinese. 
Implication 2: The state’s involvement in African economies 
In most African countries, the government’s relatively stronger position and control over 
strategic national resources have facilitated China’s access to such resources. Virtually all 
African countries are characterized by mixed economies. As is the case of many developing 
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countries, private and public firms function side by side. In some countries, the nationalization 
process is still going on. For instance, in 2004, Zimbabwe's President Mugabe announced his 
government’s plan to demand half-ownership of all privately owned mines in the country in 
order to stay in control of its natural resources (African Times, 2004b).  
In Africa, the commercial class and the national elite have a high degree of 
complementary characteristics. For instance, African commercial class lacks financial and 
managerial ability to run “high markets” such as a copper mining company or an automobile 
assembly plants (Wilson 1990). State elite, on the other hand, see professional and personal 
rewards in nationalizing such markets. Government purchases account for a significant 
proportion of imports in developing countries. For instance, in all developing countries, the 
government is the single biggest user of technology products (Nidumolu et al., 1996). In 
Ethiopia, government purchases account for 40% of total imports, with loans by international 
financial institutions such as the World Bank and the African Development Bank. China’s 
influence on many African governments has thus helped trigger China’s exports to Africa. 
Implication 3: Shift towards democracy and economic freedom  
There has been a gradual shift towards political and economic freedom in some African 
countries. For instance, Ethiopia recently moved from one-party to multi-party system. The 
above discussion indicates that such a shift may benefit India.  Indian managers tend to be more 
effective than Chinese in interacting and communicating with African local managers. Sterling 
(2009) observed: “Indian managers talk to local African managers in ways the Chinese never 
do”. 
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Implication 4: Utilizing the continent’s labor force 
Chinese and Indian companies have mainly concentrated on accessing the natural resources and 
markets in the continent. There is, however, a potential to expand their operations to utilize the 
continent’s labor force to serve international markets, especially the European ones. For instance, 
Indian offshoring companies can utilize the continents’ English, French and Portuguese speaking 
populations to provide call center services to Europeans. Likewise, Chinese firms can use  
Africa’s geographical position as proximity to Europe to establish factories in the continent and 
sell products to the European market.  
Implication 5: Importance of forward and backward linkages  
African economies are in an urgent need to move to a higher gear to benefit from foreign trades 
and investments. For instance, there are reports that the garment manufacturing industry in many 
parts of Africa is shallow. That is, this industry has few linkages to the domestic economies. In 
some African economies such as Namibia and Lesotho, even skilled direct employees for this 
industry are foreigners (Rasiah and Ofreneo, 2009). The host African countries can increase 
benefits associated with trades and investments from China and India by creating efficient 
channels for forward and backward linkages, labor mobility and stimulation of knowledge and 
technology transfer to local firms (Markusen and Venables, 1999). 
7. Conclusion  
By integrating theories related to institutions and dynamic capabilities, we have taken a 
significant step toward a greater understanding of the complexity involved in the South-South 
trade. This article has shed light on how formal and informal institutions in the home and the 
host countries affect the capabilities of firms based in China and India to operate in Africa. Since 
most studies on South-South trades have focused on intra- and inter-regional trades among Asian 
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and Latin American economies, this paper has contributed to filling an important void on such 
trades involving Africa. 
China is a bigger exogenous resources provider than India, which has helped it to exert an 
effective isomorphic pressure. In this regard, the soft power has been an important component of 
China’s coercive diplomacy. China’s expression of a strong sense of moral obligation to African 
welfare has helped it to establish normative legitimacy. China’s model of modernization has 
been exemplary, especially for authoritarian regimes in the continent, which has led to a higher 
degree of mimetic pressure. Likewise, Chinese firms’ higher degree of dominance and power in 
the world economy, development of products that are relevant to the developing world and 
access to resources have helped them build dynamic capability.  While Indians living in Africa 
are a major source of India’s competitive advantage over China, the Indian Diaspora networks 
have not been used effectively. 
Chinese firms’ better   institutional fit in some African economies and the possession of 
dynamic capability have allowed them to expand across wider geographic markets and product 
categories. China has created real business values and economic benefits, which have 
outweighed the values of India’s historical and cultural ties. China’s relative advantage 
compared to India is, however, lower in Commonwealth English-speaking countries in Africa.  
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Table 1: A Comparison of China’s and India’s Trade in selected African countries  
Country Population 
(‘000) v 
GDP per 
capita 
(PPP 
US$)k   
Commonw
ealth 
member? c 
Political 
Rights 
Score(PR) 
Civil 
Liberties 
Score 
(CL)l 
India’s trade 
(US$, million) 
China’s 
trade (US$, 
million) 
ICRG 
Composite 
Risk Rating 
(rank out of 
140 
countries) 
(Jan. 2010) 
Angola  17,499.4  2,335 No PR: 6 
CL: 5 
2004: 74; 2005:   
155, 2006:446; 
2007: 1,281a 
1998: 190 
1999:  372 
2000: 1,876 u 
 
Congo 3,847.2  1,262 No P R: 6 
CL: 5 
2004: 106q 2005: 2,050 s 
2002: 291r 
72.3 (49) 
DRC 64,703.6  714 No PR: 5 
CL: 6 
2000:  4.73;  
2001: 3.75, 
2002: 4.31,  
2003: 11.24, 
2004: 5.36, 
2005: 16.24 ,  
2006: 18.24,  
2007: 1382.19 
2002: 31 44 (139) 
Kenya  38,549.7  1,240  Yes PR: 4  
CL: 3 
2004-05: 450j 2005: 475f  61.3 (111) 
Mauritius 1,271.5  12,715  Yes PR: 1 
CL: 2 
2004: 245 
2005-06: 207 
2006-07: 751o 
2008: 323 p  
Nigeria 151,478 1,128  Yes PR: 4 
CL:4 
2008: 13,000 
2007: 8,000 m 
2007: 4,300n 
2009: 
$6373w 
60.8 (112) 
South Africa 48,832.1 11,110 Yes PR: 2 
CL: 2 
1993: 45   
2007-08:  6,000i  
2003: 3,870 
h 
2006:  8,800 
g 
70 (61) 
Sudan  39,445.0 2,083  No PR: 7 
CL: 7 
1998: 90; 1999: 
69 
 2000: 83; 
2001: 97 
2002: 111;  
2003: 149;  
2004:  225;  
2005: 349 
 2006: 624; 
2007: 563  
2008: 1,122b 
 2006: 
2,900g  
53.3 (133) 
Uganda  31,902.6  1,454  Yes PR: 5 
CL: 4 
1984: 6   
2003: 106 e 
2005: 100t 64.3 (98) 
Zimbabwe 13,481.2  2,038  No PR: 7 
CL: 6 
2006: 40 c  2005: 280d 48.3 (138) 
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aMEA (2009); bEmbassy of India, Khartoum (2009); cglobalinsight.com (2008); dMinistry of Foreign Affairs, the 
People's Republic of China  (2006); eFICCI (2004); f Omungo (2007); gFoxnews.com (2007); hfmprc.gov.cn  
(2004); 6000i pambazuka.org (2009);jVines and Oruitemeka (2008); k UNDP (2008); l a higher score represents 
lower freedom ( Freedom House 2008); mbusiness-standard.com (2009); nfinancialnigeria.com (2008); oReuters 
(2006); pchinadaily.com (2009); qDepartment of Commerce  (2005); rMinistry of Foreign Affairs,  the People's 
Republic of China (2003); sChina Economic Review (2006); tXinhua News Agency (2006); uPeople's Daily 
Online (2001); vEuromonitor International from national statistics/UN. w afriqueavenir.org/en (2010).  
Table 2: Chinese and Indian trade and investment links with SSA: A comparison in 
selected dimensions 
 
 China  India  
Trade in manufactured 
goods/commoditiesf 
• Mostly buys raw materials 
from Africa and sends finished 
goods such as clothing, electronics 
and tools back to the continent d. 
• Imports of commodities such 
as cotton and food products, which 
undergo labor-intensive 
processing in Africa are 
increasing.  
• Like China, it exports 
significantly more manufactured 
goods, machinery, electronics, 
and medical supplies to Africa 
than its imports from Africa. 
Magnitude & 
composition of 
investment nature of 
ownership & control 
(subsidiary/ branch, joint 
ventures, strategic 
alliances forged etc.) a 
• The average firm operating in 
the region is a large SOE with a 
high degree of vertical integration 
• Most sales are to government 
entities, thanks to their ability to 
out-compete other bidders. 
• Joint ventures with local firms 
increasing mainly to export from 
Africa to other markets. 
• The average firm operating in the 
region is in the private sector with 
diverse sizes 
• They enter by acquiring 
established businesses 
• The degree of vertical integration 
lower than Chinese counterparts  
• Large sales with private entities. 
• Joint ventures with local firms 
increasing mainly to export from 
Africa to other markets. 
Sectors / industries of loci 
of investmentf 
• Diverse sectors mostly large 
infrastructure projects. 
• Mainly in telecommunications, 
pharmaceuticals and manufacturing b. 
Partnerships and 
integration with local 
communitiesa, f  
• Lower degree of integration of 
managers and workers into the 
local social, economic, cultural 
and political lives in Africa 
• Provides some training to 
Africans. 
 
 
• Managers and workers are 
facilitated and encouraged participate 
in political, economic and cultural 
activities  
• The presence of informal ethnic 
networks further stimulates the 
participation. 
Impact on capability 
building & value added 
activitiesc,e  
• Limited.  • Limited.  
Strategic / commercial 
objectives involved in 
commodity trade 
• Responding to the rapid energy 
demand growth 
• Private companies’ profits from 
commodity trades 
 
aBroadman (2011); bpretorianews.co.za (2011); cBroadman (2007); dBaldauf (2010); eKshetri (2011b); 
fBroadman (2008); fBaldauf (2011). 
Table 3: A comparison of some international trade related indicators in China and India 
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Indicator  China  India 
Per capita GDP, US$ 2005c 1,713 736 
Total population (millions 1,313.0 1,134.4 
Research and development 
(R&D) expenditures 
(% of GDP) (2000-2005) c 
1.4 0.8 
Researchers in R&D (per million people) (1990-2005) c 708 119 
Patents granted to Residents (per million People) (2000-2005) c 16 1 
Receipts of royalties and license fees (US$ per person) 2005c 0.1 -- 
No. of companies in the Forbes’ “Global 2000” listb 91 47 
Electricity consumption 
per capita, 2004 (% change, 1990-2004) 
1,684 (212.4) a. 618 (77.6) a. 
GDP per unit of energy use, 2004 (2000 PPP US$ per 
kg of oil equivalent) (% change, 1990-2004) 
4.4 (108.6) a. 5.5 (37.1) a. 
aUNDP (2008);  bDeCarlo (2009); cUNDP. (2008) 
 
 
 
Notes:  
